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 1. Introduction 
The initial objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was 
to expand the European zone of peace beyond the EU’s borders through 
processes of external governance. It was seen as an instrument for 
promoting security in the region through processes of integration and 
association. Although initially developed as a rather coherent policy, it 
has over the years become something very different. In this paper, we 
examine what these changes have actually entailed.  
Our main argument is that the framework of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy – the lead framework of the EU’s external governance 
– has been developing from the original concept of a set of rationally 
planned processes coherent across countries of this Neighbourhood, 
towards a complex and ambiguous set of ‘garbage can’ type of process-
es in individual countries. We focus on the latter dimension, specifical-
ly analysing the nature of coordination of reform processes in Ukraine. 
Here, the original model of a rational process, with detailed action 
plans, monitoring, reporting and progress assessment of reforms, has 
given way to a set of loosely coupled processes involving various inter-
ests, problems, solutions and decision-making situations – what Co-
hen, March and Olsen (1972) termed the garbage can model of change. 
EU institutions and EU member states are involved in various forms of 
engagement with Ukraine, resulting in complex and often loosely cou-
pled forms of adaptation. Nevertheless, Ukraine is experiencing un-
precedented levels of extensive transformation processes connecting its 
various societal segments with the EU.  
The paper provides evidence from the case of Ukraine, building on 
recent data collected from study of official documents as well as inter-
views with diplomats and officials of the European External Action Ser-
vice (EEAS) and other EU institutions and of member states. Based on 
this analysis, we offer a novel conceptual understanding of the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy incorporating the ideas of ambiguity and 
bounded rationality.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly revisit the conven-
tional view of ENP as instrumentally rational external governance 
aimed at spreading a coherent set of EU standards beyond EU borders. 
We show that the original model is challenged by political develop-
ments on the ground, making it clear that there is a need for a comple-
mentary perspective that can take into consideration the complex and 
ambiguous nature of reforms. Second, we sketch out the ‘garbage can’ 
model originally developed in the context of studies of university bu-
reaucracies, elaborating how it could be adapted to the study of the 
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EU’s external governance. Third, applying the framework of the gar-
bage can model we analyse empirical developments in the reform pro-
cesses in Ukraine. Here, we focus on the period following the Maidan 
events, since late 2013. We analyse the involvement of EU institutions 
as well as selected member states – Germany and Sweden – and of the 
non-EU member Norway.  
Based on this empirical evidence, we argue that reform efforts are 
characterized by three features. First, there is parallelism of reform pro-
grams conducted by the EU, its member states and associated non-
member states leading to overlaps in reforms. Second, there is path-
dependence of reform programs structuring new reform initiatives in 
ways that accommodate existing programs. Third, there is general am-
biguity as to the goals of the reform processes, as the EU, the member 
states, associate non-member states and various organizations associ-
ated with them all work with various strategic goals and different vi-
sions for Ukraine and its relations with the EU. In conclusion, we offer 
some observations on the nature of the EU’s external governance in the 
countries of the neighbourhood. We argue that ambiguity and com-
plexity in the ENP reform processes may, in fact, be advantageous as a 
way of ensuring slow and gradual but relatively steady progress in 
connecting the ENP countries with the EU. 
 2. ENP as rational external governance 
The ENP framework was introduced in 2004 as a by-product of the EU’s 
‘big-bang’ enlargement. A main motivation for introducing the ENP 
was the desire to prevent major rifts from emerging between countries 
that were invited to join the EU and other East European countries. The 
idea proposed by Romano Prodi was to have these neighbouring coun-
tries take part in European governance, with access to ‘everything but 
institutions’ (Prodi 2002). To this end, countries were asked to under-
take comprehensive reforms of their economies and governance sys-
tems in exchange for gradual deepening of their ties with the EU and 
growing attachment to EU policy fields.  
This ENP had two major characteristics. First, it was a process aimed 
at creating a ‘ring of well-governed countries’ around the enlarged EU. 
This entailed putting all countries encompassed in the ENP framework 
under one more-or-less coherent set of conditions, processes and pro-
cedures of external governance (Börzel and Van Hullen 2012). 
The second characteristic of the original model was its highly ra-
tionalistic and rationalizing nature (Dannreuther 2006). The EU fol-
lowed the same comprehensive pattern institutionally, legally and in 
terms of policy contents in all the countries concerned (van Vooren 
2012:3). The methodology applied by the EU was built around a stand-
ardized model consisting of two elements. First, at the core of relations 
with each ENP country is a contractual agreement that is a prerequisite 
for signing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in Eastern 
Europe, and Caucasus and Association Agreements (AAs) in the South. 
Second, based on these agreements, individual ENP Action Plans were 
developed with each of the ENP countries. These are standardized doc-
uments of about 35 pages that follow the same structure in all coun-
tries and focus on a relatively uniform set of topics for collaboration 
and governance reform.1 ENP Progress Reports would then provide a 
regular opportunity for monitoring the developments and assessing the 
degree to which the goals and targets in the Action Plans were met. The 
European Commission and its Directorate-General for Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy has been taking the lead in the management of 
these processes, in cooperation with the External Services of the Com-
mission and, following its establishment, the EEAS. In principle, the 
overarching idea when the ENP was launched was to have a well-
                                                          
1  Topics in ENP Action Plans include: economic development, environmental policy, 
energy cooperation, border control, food safety, organized crime, migration man-
agement, terrorism, regional conflict prevention, political dialogue, nuclear non-
proliferation, tourism, education, tax policy and others (see Van Vooren 2012:3).  
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defined and orderly set of transformation processes to lead these 
‘neighbourhood’ countries towards EU-oriented standardization of 
their legislative systems and governance that would allow them to 
share ‘all but institutions’ with the EU. 
However, several factors have made today’s ENP complex and am-
biguous as compared to the original processes of relatively coherent, 
unified and instrumentally rational external governance conducted in 
relation to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. While a compre-
hensive analysis is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper, it is 
pertinent to mention at least four factors.  
First, while the ENP framework uses similar instruments as the pro-
cess of EU enlargement, the central component of the latter – the pro-
spect of full EU membership – is missing. That makes the ENP is pro-
foundly ambiguous in its aims and nature of relations with the coun-
tries in the neighbourhood (Cadier 2013). Partly as a result of this, 
countries encompassed in the ENP framework have varied in their pref-
erences concerning attachment to the EU. Since 2011, the EU has been 
applying an increasingly differentiated and bottom–up approach to-
wards the partner countries (EU 2015a,b). This shift has to do with the 
fact that ENP countries have been subject to a rather divergent set of 
domestic processes, putting them on diverging paths in their relations 
to the EU over the past decade. While the 16 ENP countries remain 
grouped together within the same framework, there is a clear difference 
emerging between the nature of relations to countries in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood and the countries in the EU’s Southern Neighbour-
hood. While the latter cannot aspire to EU membership, some of the 
former possibly can, and that also influences the level of ambitions in 
reform processes (Rieker 2016). Moreover, while some ENP countries, 
like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in the east as well as Morocco and 
Tunisia in the south, have been seeking closer relations with the EU, 
consistently implementing various kinds of reforms to achieve this, 
other countries, among them Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, have 
shown decreasing interest in deepener relations with the EU and have 
been seeking to develop a more detached form of relationship.2 The 
macro-level dynamic of how neighbouring countries form their rela-
tionships with the EU is highly diversified.  
Second, the EU and its member states are beginning to become more 
attentive to the geopolitical context (concerning relations with Russia 
in particular) in developing their approach to the neighbourhood 
(Rieker & Gjerde 2015). The interests of the ‘neighbours of the neigh-
bours’ are increasingly recognized as a factor to be reckoned with. 
Compared to its original meaning when introduced by the European 
                                                          
2  Indeed, much to the surprise of the EU’s external relations institutions,  Azerbaijan 
was the first country from the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood to propose its own vi-
sion of a legally regulated relationship with the EU, in the spring of 2015. 
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Commission in 2006,3 the concept today encompasses also the inter-
ests of Russia and other major geopolitical players in the neighbour-
hood. This shift is supported by a growing acknowledgement of the 
need to shift towards a more geopolitical  approach to the EU neigh-
bourhood  (Fischer 2015).  
Third, the ENP framework was designed in an ambiguous way, leav-
ing room for manoeuvre for member states to accommodate their spe-
cific interests within the policy framework (Cadier 2013:53). Among 
other things, the question of whether the possibility of full membership 
should eventually be granted to neighbouring states has been per-
ceived differently by the original member states and by those that have 
joined the EU since the 1990s (ibid.). In general, the latter states have 
been most supportive of keeping alive the prospect of further EU en-
largement to the East (Berti et al. 2015). As a result of this ambiguity, 
EU member states continue with varying and parallel strategies in their 
relations to the countries of the neighbourhood. Despite similarities in 
member-state rhetoric in relation to ENP countries, the goals pursued 
in practice often differ (Börzel and Van Hullen 2012). 
Finally, within ENP countries, implementation of the reforms identi-
fied in the individual ‘ENP Action Plans’ and ‘ENP Progress Reports’ 
has not necessarily been a straightforward rational exercise. This has 
involved, for instance, the development and application by the EU of 
what Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011) term ‘pseudo-benchmarks’. 
This means that the EU has been assessing various formal indicators in 
the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood to measure their perfor-
mance in democratic reforms, but that these indicators have not really 
assessed actual progress made. Also, reform processes aligning gov-
ernance structures with the EU have progressed well in some govern-
ance sectors, while there has been less progress in others (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2011; Bátora and Navrátil 2016). Alternative sources 
of reforms have also played an important role. Non-EU countries like 
Canada, Japan, Norway and the USA as well as international actors 
such as the World Bank have been involved in supporting reform pro-
cesses in the EU’s neighbourhood, often with their own specific agen-
das and goals.  
The relevant EU institutions and their stakeholders have been re-
flecting upon this. There has emerged a clear realization that the ENP 
as a policy framework needs to be reformed to encompass differentia-
tion of relations with partner countries as a key principle (EU 2015). 
This builds on the idea that the EU will respect partner countries’ stra-
tegic choices as regards how they wish to constitute their relations with 
the EU. With countries seeking closer association, the EU will seek to 
develop practical steps to deepen relations; with countries preferring a 
                                                          
3  See On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2006)726, Brus-
sels: European Commission, p. 11 
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more detached form of relations, the EU will look for other forms of 
engagement in line with their needs (ibid., p. 3).  In addition, the EU 
will to a greater extent take into consideration the whole region and the 
geopolitical context than the case thus far (ibid., p. 4). 
Especially important in the context of the current analysis is that the 
idea of the EU’s neighbourhood policy as a coherent, rationalistic and 
well-planned strategy is a convenient construct that may not hold up to 
closer scrutiny. To get an analytical grip on the nature of the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy, it behoves us to drop default assumptions of 
instrumental rationality and instead consider lessons from approaches 
conceptualizing ambiguity and uncertainty in decision-making and 
political reforms (Simon 1955; March and Simon 1957; Cyert and 
March 1963; Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). Such an organization-
theory-oriented approach may help us to focus on dynamics that char-
acterize most types of political reforms in practice but tend to be over-
looked in reform plans as well as in a posteriori accounts of reforms.
 3. The ENP as a set of garbage can pro-
cesses: an analytical framework 
While the above-mentioned interpretation of the ENP may seem com-
pelling, the reality of ENP is more complex and ambiguous. Policy ini-
tiatives of EU-level institutions are not always coordinated with those 
of the member states (Democracy Reporting International 2015). Re-
forms in ENP countries go through various cycles of swift and slower 
implementation4 (Carnegie 2015). Decisions involve multiple actors 
from member-state governments, EU institutions and non-
governmental organizations that promote various and shifting kinds of 
interests. Particular reform efforts coalesce around assemblages of ac-
tors and interests (Democracy Reporting International 2015). 
The garbage can model of organizational decision-making proposed 
by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) provides a useful analytical frame-
work for examining the EU’s involvement in complex and ambiguous 
reform processes like those unfolding within the framework of the ENP. 
The model conceptualizes organizational decisions and actions as re-
sulting from more or less random assemblages of four factors. First, 
there are problems that need to be solved: this requires attention and 
various kinds of resources. Second, there are solutions that are availa-
ble, often prior to identification and formulation of relevant problems: 
this means that solutions become answers that are looking for ques-
tions. Third, there are participants with various interests providing var-
ious kinds of input. The length of their presence relevant to a studied 
organizational process varies, as their attention and availability may 
shift elsewhere.  Fourth, there are choice opportunities – the occasions 
on which decisions and choices regarding actions in a given organiza-
tional context are made. This includes negotiation and signing of 
agreements, allocation of financial and other resources, etc. The thrust 
of the garbage can model is the idea that these four factors develop in 
flows relatively independent of each other, with their relatively random 
combinations producing organizational decisions. Viewed from this 
perspective, organized processes are based, not on calculated rational 
choices, but on relatively random assemblages of problems, solutions, 
participants and choice opportunities.  
Applying this framework used to study micro-level processes in or-
ganizations to the study of the EU’s neighbourhood policy may not 
seem entirely self-evident. Yet, the primary focus here is on the opera-
                                                          
4  http://www.financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/ukraine/ukraine-should-be-forced-
to-implement-reforms/ 
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tion of the ENP as an organized framework for promotion of EU-led 
reforms in the EU’s neighbourhood. What interests us here are reform 
processes and how problems, solutions, participants and choice oppor-
tunities intermingle to form reforms. We use empirical data based on 
interviews and study of official documents to shed light on the process-
es of how the EU has been engaging with Ukraine in support of reforms. 
The scope of this study does not allow coverage of all activities of all 
member states, so we focus on EU institutions and on two selected 
member states – Germany and Sweden – as well as on one associated 
member – Norway. The choice of studying EU institutions and their 
engagement in Ukraine’s reform processes is an obvious one, but our 
selection of Germany, Norway and Sweden as cases to study here re-
quires further elaboration. Important here are two factors – level of 
engagement with Ukraine, and public availability of data. Regarding 
the first factor,  in recent years, Germany and Sweden have been the 
most active EU member states as regards engagement with the coun-
tries in the Neighbourhood, Ukraine in particular (ECFR 2014, 2015). 
Norway is also among the highly active players in the EU neighbour-
hood, closely aligning its policies with those of the EU (NOU, 2012). 
Since the start of the most recent crisis in Ukraine, Norway has radical-
ly increased its aid to that country, so that the figure was about ten 
times higher in 2015 compared to the level in 2013.  Moreover, a focus 
on Norway adds a useful dimension when we seek to capture the com-
plexity of factors influencing reforms in Ukraine as the EU’s neigh-
bourhood policy continues to rely on resources and activities of non-EU 
member states.5  
Regarding the second factor, the governments of Germany, Norway 
and Sweden, compared with those of many other EU member and non-
member states, provide relatively extensive pools of publically availa-
ble empirical data on their activities in support of reforms in Ukraine in 
the recent decades. Data accessibility was an important factor in our 
choice of these countries’ engagement in Ukraine for the current analy-
sis. Still, the empirical examples of processes we study are by no means 
exhaustive or all-encompassing – much more space would be neces-
sary for that. These three serve merely as illustrations of the complex 
nature of the processes involved in the EU’s engagement with Ukraine.  
In operationalizing the analytical dimensions, we will explore how 
problems are defined in key strategic documents published by the EU 
and its member states in relation to Ukraine. This will allow us to speak 
to the degree of parallelism in the definition of problems and solutions. 
Second, we will measure path dependence in exploring the extent to 
which solutions currently offered had been available and implemented 
in Ukraine prior to the launch of major post-Maidan reform strategies in 
                                                          
5  The USA, for instance, has been a major donor of aid money to Ukraine. In the dec-
ade between 1990 and 2000, the USA provided more than USD 1 billion to Ukraine 
(Rotter 2011:34).  
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2014 and 2015. High degrees of path-dependence of solutions will 
mean that problems were defined in the context of numerous available 
solutions. Finally, we will explore the aims of the EU and of the gov-
ernments studied in terms of their views on the nature of Ukraine’s fu-
ture relations with the EU. This expression of goals will be assessed as 
an indicator of overall clarity and/or ambiguity of the EU’s engagement 
with Ukraine. 
 4. ENP in post-Maidan Ukraine 
In the period between 2013 and 2015, Ukrainian reforms have been 
progressing at an extraordinary pace, on several indicators.6 The ratio 
of gas supplies provided by the EU and Russia, respectively, has shifted 
from 5:95% to 67:33%. While in 2013 Ukrainian governmental agen-
cies had as many as 1032 controlling functions, this was reduced to 
680 in 2015. The number of regulatory agencies in the country was 
reduced from 56 to 28, and the number of state employees from 
335,270 to an estimated 257,000. The tax system was simplified and 
the number of taxes was reduced from 22 to 11. Expenses for security 
and defence climbed from UAH 45.3 to 90.7 billion (approx. from € 1.7 
billion to € 3.5 billion) and salaries of military personnel on all levels 
were tripled or quadrupled.  Numerous other reforms were underway 
on a massive scale on all levels of government and virtually in all parts 
of the Ukrainian society. Yet, the post-Maidan wave of reforms has not 
come about in a vacuum. These reforms have been conducted in the 
context of long-term reform processes supported by the EU, its member 
states and associated non-member states as well as other Western ac-
tors since the early 1990s. Post-Maidan reform strategies and instru-
ments have had to accommodate established reform programmes, na-
tional priorities, the priorities of various EU-level actors and, of course, 
also the interplay with domestic interests and the social structures. This 
has resulted in the varying degrees of parallelism, path-dependence 
and ambiguity that characterize the ENP in post-Maidan Ukraine. In the 
following, we examine these three dimensions.  
4.1 Parallelism and path-dependence in defining problems 
and solutions in Ukraine 
The EU’s engagement with Ukraine has been characterized by multiple 
parallel definitions of key problems facing the country and of solutions 
that will help in addressing those. Various actors involved have been 
working with differing albeit partly overlapping definitions of prob-
lems. The EU has had its ENP Action Plans for Ukraine since 2004, but 
the Maidan events in 2013 and early 2014 brought about a need to 
address newly emerging problems as well as update existing strategies. 
Following the visit by Commissioners Füle and Lewandowski to Kiev on 
25–26 March 2014, the EU, the Ukrainian government and non-
governmental actors set about working on a strategic document that 
                                                          
6  These indicators are taken from ‘A Year of the Government of Ukraine’, presentation 
at the International Support for Ukraine Conference, Kiev, 28 April 2015 (available 
at  http://supportforukraine.com/mediafiles/files/1year_en.pdf, accessed  
29.11.15)  
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would include a list of key challenges facing Ukraine in the short to 
medium term (problems in the context of the current analysis), with a 
list of corresponding solutions as well as identification of actors on the 
EU and the Ukrainian sides,  who would be responsible for addressing 
the problems. The resulting document, titled EU–Ukraine: A European 
Agenda for Reform and introduced on 4 July 2014, included nine key 
areas: political process; economic support; trade and customs; agricul-
tural issues; justice and home affairs, including the fight against cor-
ruption; enterprise; energy; transport; and education, scientific and 
technological cooperation.7 The document defines more than 60 chal-
lenges or ‘problems’ where which Ukraine would need support for 
promoting various kinds of reforms, as well as sources of funding for 
addressing the problems.  
While the problems and activities identified in the document EU–
Ukraine Agenda for Reform continued to be addressed, the EU and 
Ukraine adopted a new strategic document – the EU–Ukraine Associa-
tion Agenda – on 16 March  2015.8 Based on this document, Table 1 
provides an overview of these problems as well as proposed solutions 
and actions for addressing them. 
  
                                                          
7  See EU – Ukraine: A European Agenda for Reform. Brussels: European Commission, 
July 4, 2014 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-
2014/fule/docs/ukraine/a_european_agenda_for_reform.pdf, accessed 10.09. 
15).  
8  EU–Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the 
Association Agreement; Brussels: EEAS, 16 March  2015. 
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Table 1: Problems and solutions in Ukraine, as identified in the 2015 EU–
Ukraine Association Agenda  
Problem Proposed solutions and actions for addressing the problem 
Constitution is defunct; does 
not regulate regional and 
local governance properly 
 constitutional reform to be re-launched 
 work in consultation with civil society and respect the 
recommendations of the Venice Commission  
 develop amendments enabling decentralization reform 
and reform of the judiciary 
Electoral system is inefficient  unify electoral legislation  
 reform of political party financing  
 revise law on local elections 
Corruption is widespread  work towards implementing of comprehensive anti-
corruption legal package of 14 October 2014  
 establish a National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Na-
tional Agency for the Prevention of Corruption 
Judiciary is not working 
properly 
 launch judiciary reform 
 adopt a Justice Reform Strategy in line with European 
standards, with detailed implementation plan 
Public administration is 
inefficient 
 launch public administration reform 
 initiate civil service reform and reform of service in 
local self-government bodies, based on European 
standards  
 adopt Law on Civil Service Reform 
Level of regulation for enter-
prises is too high 
 decrease the administrative burden for enterprises by 
reducing the number of permits and licenses required 
Public procurement is 
inefficient 
 launch reform of public procurement 
 improve transparency in public procurement processes  
 bring the list of exceptions from public procurement in 
line with EU public procurement directives 
Taxation system is inefficient  launch taxation reform; 
 improve efficiency of the tax administration, also in 
settlement of VAT refund claims 
External audit is lacking  continue to develop external audit function to 
strengthen the system of checks and balances 
Energy sector works 
inefficiently 
 launch energy sector reform 
 accelerate the reform of Naftogaz, adopting a law on a 
new regulatory body for gas, electricity and utilities;  
 draft new laws on gas and electricity market in consul-
tation with the EU 
Source: Developed from EU–Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facili-
tate the implementation of the Association Agreement; Brussels: EEAS, 16 
March  2015, pp. 5–7. 
 
Obviously, while there is some overlap between these two key strategic 
documents adopted in 2014 and in 2015, there are also areas in which 
the latter strategy is less comprehensive. This pertains in particular to 
problems in the areas of security sector reform and agricultural reform.  
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Member states of the EU have also come up with their national defi-
nitions of key problems facing Ukraine. Germany has been actively in-
volved in supporting transformation processes since the early 1990s, 
with several major strategies of reforms defined by Germany. Between 
1994 and 2005, Germany spent € 87.5 million via bilateral pro-
grammes to Ukraine and another € 115 million via the TRANSFORM 
Programme (Rotter 2011:34). In the context of post-Maidan develop-
ments, in early June 2015 the German government provided its own list 
of key problems facing Ukraine in its Action Plan for Ukraine (Federal 
Government of Germany 2015). The plan includes a list of five prob-
lem-areas and a list of solutions that Germany will provide to address 
those (see Table 2). The German government declared its willingness to 
spend about €700 mill. in 2015 to support attainment of goals in this 
Action Plan (Federal Government of Germany 2015:2). This is more 
than triple the amount of money spent by Germany on aid to Ukraine 
during the entire period 1990 to  2007.   
Numerous German governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions have also been actively engaged in addressing problems in 
Ukraine. This includes the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (the German Association for International Coop-
eration), working in Ukraine since the early 1990s on behalf of various 
ministries of the German federal government. Their definition of key 
problems includes three areas: sustainability of economic develop-
ment, energy efficiency, and spread of HIV/AIDS.9 Various solutions 
have been proposed in these areas. The GIZ initiated numerous projects 
in cooperation with the ministries of the Ukrainian government and 
commissioned numerous reports on how the Ukrainian public admin-
istration and public services could be reformed – mostly using solu-
tions operating in the Federal Republic of Germany as a source of com-
parison, good practice and benchmarking.10 This included the provi-
sion of expert comments and suggestions on proposals for new legisla-
tive acts in the field of Ukrainian public administration reform in 2008 
– again specifically from a German perspective and using German legal 
practices as examples.11 Since 2006, the GIZ has also been working 
with the Ministry of Healthcare in Ukraine in support of efforts to curb 
the HIV/AIDS epidemics. It has organized workshops and trainings for 
healthcare professionals and teachers, supported by a budget of €3.5 
                                                          
9  See http://www.ims-ukraine.org/en, accessed on Sept 10, 2015.  
10  The GIZ has been publishing its expert reports on in Ukraine since 2008. See 
http://www.ims-ukraine.org/en/publications (accessed 10.09.15)   
11  See, for instance, Schimanke, D. und Zimmermann, H. (2008): Stellungnahme zu 
Konzept und Gesetzentwurf zur Administrativ-territorialen Reform in der Ukraine, 
Projektdokument N. 19, GIZ, Kiev, November 2008 (available at  http://www.ims-
ukraine.org/sites/default/files/Nr-19-deutsch.pdf; accessed 10.09.15).  
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mill.12 Solutions for Ukraine’s problems have also been proposed by 
foundations affiliated with political parties in Germany, such as the 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. The former, for 
instance, has recently used German experience in sustainable econom-
ic development as a benchmark for solutions that could be implement-
ed in Ukraine.13  
Table 2: Problems and solutions in Ukraine as identified in the June 2015 
Action Plan from the German Federal Government 
Problem Solutions and actions for addressing the problems 
Low efficiency of energy and 
resource usage 
 updating the Ukrainian electrical power networks to enable their compat-
ibility with EU standards 
 refurbishing electrical switching stations in Eastern Ukraine 
 launching pilot projects on efficient energy use in buildings 
Inefficient infrastructure in 
the economy 
 support for SMEs 
 counselling in agricultural reform 
 improving local infrastructure  
 support reforms of toll/tax administration 
 support to the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture in preparing the ‘Strategy 
for the sustainable development of Ukraine’s agricultural sector  2015–
2020’  
 support to the Ukrainian government in road and railway infrastructure 
development  
High levels of centralization  support to the Ukrainian government in decentralization and municipal 
government reforms 
 work with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and  Slovakia in setting 
up partnership networks for sharing good governance practices with 
Ukrainian municipalities 
 contribute to improving capacities for local crisis management 
Limited rule of law; high 
levels of corruption 
 support to the establishment of institutions for rule of law and anti- 
corruption work 
 comprehensive legal counselling in constitutional reform and reform of 
the judiciary 
 support to the fight against corruption in the judiciary 
Limited role of civil society 
and media 
 support the establishment of NGOs focusing on human rights, rule of law 
and societal conflict prevention 
 expand the Ukrainian- and Russian- language programmes of Deutsche 
Welle 
 support the establishment of public TV and radio broadcasting in Ukraine 
 training of journalists 
Source: Developed from the document Aktionsplan Ukraine, of the government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 5 June 2015 (available at 
http://www.kiew.diplo.de/contentblob/4539124/Daten/5510808/pdf_aktionsplan.pdf, ac-
cessed 14.10.15). The document contains far more detail than captured in the above table. 
                                                          
12  See 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/ziele/ziele/MDGs_2015/unser_beitrag/
ukraine.html (accessed 10.09.15).  
13  See Nachhaltige Entwicklungspolitik: deutsche Erfahrungen bei der Lösung 
ökologischer und sozialer Probleme, Perspektiven deren Anwendung in der Ukraine. 
KAS Policy Paper 23, Kiev: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2 September  2015 (available 
at http://www.kas.de/ukraine/de/publications/42407/, accessed 14.09.15) 
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Also Sweden has been working with Ukraine in supporting reform pro-
cesses since 1995. In the years 2009 to 2013, its efforts were concen-
trated in two problem areas, identified as key challenges where Sweden 
could be of assistance to Ukraine: democratic governance and human 
rights; and natural resources and environment. Sweden provided SEK 
180 mill. (approx. € 18 mill.) in financial support in 2009; SEK 200 
mill. (approx. € 20 mill.) in 2010 and about SEK 220 mill.  (approx. € 
22 mill.) in the years 2011–2013.14 As the Swedish government ex-
plains, the choice of the two focal areas of reforms was made ‘based on 
reform needs identified by Ukraine in its communication with the EU, 
Sweden’s comparative advantages and activities carried out by other 
donors.’15 In response to the recent conflict, Sweden has increased its 
annual support to Ukraine by about SEK 235 mill. (approx. €23.5 mill.) 
since 2014.16 Sweden has also updated the definition of problem areas 
in which it supports development cooperation projects. There were, as 
of the time of writing (December 2015), four key areas: enhanced eco-
nomic integration with the EU and the development of market econo-
my; strengthened democracy, with greater respect for human rights 
and a more fully developed state under the rule of law; a better envi-
ronment, with reduced climate-change impact, and enhanced resili-
ence to environmental impact and climate change; and humanitarian 
support.17 Of particular importance here are activities of Swedish In-
ternational Development Cooperation (SIDA), which has been support-
ing projects in at least five areas (see Table 3). In 2014, SIDA provided 
more than SEK 181 mill. (about €18 mill.) in aid to Ukraine.18 As of 
September 2015, there were 52 projects supported by Swedish gov-
ernmental funds developing solutions in various areas in Ukraine. Of 
these, 31 projects had been initiated in November 2013 or earlier (with 
some ongoing projects launched as far back as 2007).19 As can be seen 
from Table 3, several of the issue-areas feature solutions based on ex-
periences of Swedish actors – in particular in the area of local govern-
ance, energy and civilian security sector reform. 
                                                          
14  See Samarbetsstrategi for utvecklingssamarbetet med Ukraina januari 2009 –
december 2013. Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 December  
2008 (available at 
http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/14ff44c69d9141219ca5eb51130a20be/
strategi-for-utvecklingssamarbetet-med-ukraina-2009-2013, accessed 23.11.15).  
15  Ibid., p. 2 
16  http://www.government.se/opinion-pieces/2014/11/swedens-commitment-to-
ukraine-deepens/  
17  For a complete list of projects supported, with brief descriptions and financial al-
lotments see  http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-
GB/Embassies/Kyiv/Development-Cooperation/Development-Cooperation-with-
Ukraine/; accessed 14.09.15. 
18  See http://www.sida.se/English/where-we-work/Europe/Ukraine-/Cooperation-in-
figures/, accessed 22.11.15 
19  For an overview of project aims, funding and duration see 
http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/Kyiv/Development-
Cooperation/Development-Cooperation-with-Ukraine/, accessed 14.09.15) 
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Table 3: Problems and solutions in Ukraine as identified by Swedish Interna-
tional Development Cooperation (SIDA) 
Problems Solutions and actions for addressing the problems 
Low market integration with the EU Support projects of OECD, World Bank, EBRD to pro-
mote:  
 increased transparency  
 favourable investment climate 
 improved conditions for SMEs  
Sharp deterioration of human rights 
standards 
 Over 1 million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), many lacking basic 
security 
 National minorities – primarily 
Crimean Tatars and the Roma popu-
lation – as well as LGBT people have 
become more vulnerable 
 Ukrainian society is heavily male- 
dominated; domestic violence 
against women is widespread  
Support human rights organizations dealing with these 
problems: 
 Charkiv Human Rights Group and the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Human Rights Union (documentation, pol-
icy work and dialogue with the government) 
 Gay Alliance Ukraine  
 National Democratic Institute (working to increase 
the number of female political leaders and to re-
form Ukrainian legislation and practices, aiming at 
implementation of the Council of Europe Conven-
tion on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence) 
Inefficient public sector: 
 Public administration skills at the 
local level are low in municipalities 
 High levels of corruption 
 High levels of centralization 
 Underdeveloped e-governance 
Support projects addressing these problems: 
 cooperation between the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) and the 
Ukrainian Ministry for Regional Development to 
promote decentralisation (including expert advice, 
training, study visits and seminars)  
 project between the Estonian organization e-
governance Academy and Ukrainian authorities 
aimed at providing the public and entrepreneurs 
with more transparent and more efficient public 
services with the help of web services 
Energy sector is inefficient; no tradition 
of saving energy  
Support projects aimed at increasing energy efficiency: 
 investments in energy saving at the local level, 
through the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and 
Environment Partnership (E5P) and Nordic Envi-
ronment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) 
 environmental organizations working to improve 
energy efficiency 
Massive humanitarian crisis following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 
war in Eastern Ukraine 
 Provide humanitarian assistance  channelled 
through organizations including UNHCR, UNICEF, 
OCHA, ICRC and Save the Children, aimed at 
providing people with shelter, access to water and 
sanitation, and psychosocial support 
Source: Our work in Ukraine. Stockholm: SIDA, updated 5 August2015, available at  
http://www.sida.se/English/where-we-work/Europe/Ukraine-/Our-work-in-Ukraine/, 
accessed 22.11.15. 
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Norway has been active in Ukraine recently, and it explicitly supports 
the approach of the EU. In the period since the Maidan events in late 
2013 and early 2014, the Norwegian government has increased its fi-
nancial support substantially. Norway provided NOK 106.5 mill. (more 
than € 11 mill.) in development aid to Ukraine in 2014 – up from NOK 
34.6 mill. NOK (€3.6 mill.) in 2013, NOK 22.8 mill. (€ 2.4 mill.) in 2010 
and a mere NOK 1.4 mill. (about €150,000) in 2005.20 Norwegian offi-
cial development aid to Ukraine has increased 100-fold in the last 10 
years, with the most significant year-on-year increase between 2013 
and 2014. In 2015, Norway’s overall support to Ukraine amounted to 
NOK 310 mill. (approx..€ 36.35 mill.);21 Norway has committed itself 
to  NOK 390 mill. for 2016. Earlier support from Norway had been some 
NOK 40 mill. annually since the mid-1990s. As explained by Norway’s 
State Secretary (junior minister) for Foreign Affairs in late April 2015, 
Norway focuses on the following priorities in its support to Ukraine: 
budget support; energy reform; European integration; good govern-
ance, transparency and accountability; strengthening of civil society 
and free media;  and the fight against corruption  (Brattskaar 2015). All 
recent projects aim at assisting Ukraine in complying with EU stand-
ards.22 In 2015, Norwegian support has been allocated as budget sup-
port (NOK 100 mill. or € 10.3 mill.); to security sector and constitution-
al reform (NOK 73 mill or € 7.5 mill.); energy reform and nuclear safety 
(NOK 77 mill. or € 7.9 mill.); trade facilitation and EU integration (NOK 
20 mill. or € 2.06 mill.) as well as general humanitarian aid (NOK 40 
mill or € 4.12 mill.).23 At the time of writing (December 2015), the 
Norwegian government was supporting  37 different projects in 
Ukraine.24 As of mid-October 2015, main priorities for Norway’s sup-
port to Ukraine were defined as follows: judicial reform and good gov-
ernance; energy sector reform and efficiency; improving the country’s 
competitiveness; strengthening the private sector and entrepreneur-
ship; and help to IDPs from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.25 In addition 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway’s Ministry of Defence actively 
supports reforms in Ukraine. For instance, the Centre for Integrity in 
the Defence Sector (SIFS) in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence has 
recently offered Ukraine support and assistance to the process of adapt-
ing the Ukrainian human resource management system in the defence 
sector to EU standards by raising awareness of integrity and anti-
corruption issues. 26  Finally, Norway has agreed with the EU to intro-
                                                          
20  See http://www.norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/, accessed 22.11.15.  
21  See http://www.norway.com.ua/News_and_events1/Grants_and_projects/Norways-support-
to-Ukraine-in-2015/#.VlFOTHYveM8, accessed 22.11.15.  
22  http://www.norway.com.ua/News_and_events1/Grants_and_projects/#.VjInu8mEr9c 
23  http://nucc.no/norway-increases-its-support-to-ukraine/’’ 
24  http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/nb/sector/details?country=14&year=2015  
25  http://www.eu-norway.org/news1/Norway-to-increase-support-to-Ukraine-by-NOK-80-
million/#.VjDdhcmEr9c  
26  See http://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/5121-norway-supports-ukraines-efforts-to-
combat-corruption 
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duce regional funds in the EEA grant scheme, which opens up these 
grants for projects undertaken by new member states in collaboration 
with partners in Ukraine and Moldova.27 
As these examples show, EU member states as well as associated 
member states like Norway have their own lists of problems they have 
been seeking to address in Ukraine with the support of their own finan-
cial frameworks and programmes, while also supporting the work on 
problems defined by the EU, as discussed above. In all cases, there has 
been a significant expansion of the volume of finances provided to 
Ukraine since early 2014, as well as an expansion of the problem areas 
that donor countries and their organizations seek to address by tailor-
made solutions drawing on resources at their disposal. On the other 
hand, some of the problems and programmes for dealing with them 
have been around for a decade or longer, and there is also significant 
overlap between countries in the problems their programmes address 
in Ukraine. 
Table 4: Problems and solutions in Ukraine as identified by the Norwegian 
government 
Problems Solutions and actions for addressing the problems 
Lack of retraining of 
military officers 
 retraining of military officers and family members  
Low levels of energy 
efficiency 
 support to energy efficiency and humanitarian support (NEFCO) 
Lack of possibilities 
for SMEs 
 competence transfer from Norwegian Innovation System to Ukraine and institution-
al capacity-building for the Ukrainian Innovation System aimed at developing and 
supporting SMEs and start-ups with innovative business ideas 
Lack of reintegration 
of victims of human 
trafficking 
 reintegration assistance to 1500 victims of human trafficking in Ukraine based on 
their individual needs and psychological care, legal representation; requalification 
and economic empowerment 
Low level of green 
technology 
 support to the development of energy technology facilities in conjunction with the 
establishment of a knowledge and training centre for bioenergy. 
Limited bilateral 
business relations 
 developing business relations Ukraine–Norway (import, export, investment, good 
corporate governance) 
Need for local gov-
ernment reform 
 capacity-building for local governments in service provision; evidence-based policy 
dialogue within the social sector sphere (health, education and social protection), 
as well as promoting participatory governance and a robust local democracy 
Lack of support to IDPs  support to long-term integration of IDPs from Crimea and Donbass regions of 
Ukraine in host communities, covering socio-economic, infrastructural and cultural 
dimensions 
Lack of a free and 
independent media 
 support to justice and accountability by working with and supporting journalists, 
independent media outlets and activists, to achieve transparency, access to infor-
mation and justice for abuses  
Lack of respect for 
human rights 
 Financial support to national human rights organizations.  
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information from: 
http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/nb/partner/details?country=14&year=2015  (December 
2015) 
                                                          
27  http://eeagrants.org/News/2015/Agreement-secured-on-new-funding-round 
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An analysis of the dates when projects were initiated by donor coun-
tries – in this paper focusing on Germany, Norway and Sweden – 
shows relatively high degrees of path-dependence in the reform pro-
grams. Some 88% of German projects and 61% of Swedish reform pro-
jects in Ukraine were launched in the pre-Maidan period, i.e. before the 
end of 2013 (see Figure 1). Turning to the number of aid projects pro-
vided by all EU-level institutions combined, we find that of the 1805 
EU-funded projects active in Ukraine in 2015, as many as 1696 (93%) 
had been launched in the pre-Maidan period.28  New comprehensive 
reform strategies by the EU launched in 2014 and 2015 (e.g. EU – 
Ukraine Agenda for Reform) have had to work with numerous solutions 
that were made available before the problems were defined in these 
strategies. This in turn indicates that, in formulating the 2014 and 
2015 strategies and in defining problems, the solutions already being 
offered to Ukraine by the EU and by the three states studied here have 
structured the choices and formulations of new reform strategies. As 
compared to Germany and Sweden, Norway shows a relatively low de-
gree of path-dependence in its reform efforts in Ukraine (see Figure 1). 
This has to do with the fact that Norway had not been very active in 
Ukraine in the pre-Maidan period, and began focusing on problems in 
response to post-Maidan events. This may mean that Norway’s solu-
tions may be more up-to-date and better for dealing with actual needs 
in Ukraine today than the case with other reform efforts launched pre-
viously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28  Data on the EU projects from the EU Aid Explorer database (available EU Aid Explor-
er: https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/SearchPageAction.do; accessed 12.12. 15) 
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Figure 1: Degree of path-dependence in reform programs in Ukraine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ger-
many, project database; Swedish Embassy to Ukraine and Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Grants Portal. 29  Percentages were calculated from all ac-
tive projects funded by the respective government in Ukraine in 2015. Projects 
launched before the end of 2013 were seen as being launched in the pre-
Maidan period (shown in blue).  
4.2 Coordinating multiple actors 
ENP processes in Ukraine have been characterized by a dynamic flow of 
participants and their shifting constellations. This has included EU 
institutions and EU-level initiatives as well as member-state govern-
ments and other organizations and their initiatives. Below we review 
efforts to coordinate key EU-level participants as well as those from 
Germany, Norway and Sweden. 
Various EU-level institutions have been involved in supporting re-
forms in Ukraine since the early 1990s. The focus of our analysis here 
is on the actors and actions of EU institutions in the wake of the crisis 
since early 2014. On 5 March  2014, the European Commission an-
nounced the Support Package for Ukraine, set to bring approx. € 11 
                                                          
29  Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, project database 
(available at http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/transparenz-fuer-
mehr-Wirksamkeit/iati/index.jsp;; Swedish Embassy to Ukraine 
(http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/Kyiv/Development-
Cooperation/Development-Cooperation-with-Ukraine/; accessed 12.12.15); Nor-
wegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grants Portal 
(http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/en/sector/details?country=14&year=2015. 
All accessed 12.12.15.   
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billion in EU funding and an additional €1.4 billion in grants from 
member states over the next seven years.30 Between 2013 and 2015, 
there was a sharp increase in interaction between EU institutions and 
the Ukrainian authorities, for example the activities of the Technical 
Assistance and Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX) of the Europe-
an Commission (see Figure 2).   
Figure 2: Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) 
activities of the European Commission in Eastern Partnership countries, 2013 
to 2015 (source:  Gozzi 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the Support Package for Ukraine, investments, distribution 
of grant money and management of various reform initiatives are to be 
conducted by the European Commission in cooperation with several 
other organizations, most notably the European Investment Bank and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as 
drawing additional funds from the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. The same document notes the need to establish an 
international donor coordination mechanism in the form of an interna-
tional platform based in Kiev, to coordinate the efforts of EU institu-
tions, EU member states as well as other international donors in 
Ukraine.31 The platform is to meet regularly in Brussels, to enable close 
coordination of donor efforts. On the ground, the EU Delegation will be 
responsible for coordination.32 The international donor coordination 
platform was established on 27 May 2014, holding its first meeting on 
8 June that year. A Development Assistance Database for Ukraine has 
                                                          
30  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine/index_en.ht
m, accessed 24.11.15.  
31  See Support Package for Ukraine. Brussels: European Commission, 5 March  2014, 
p. 4 (available at http://europa.eu/newsroom/files/pdf/ukraine_en.pdf, accessed 
24.11.15)  
32  ibid. 
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also been also established to provide an overview to donors of projects 
implemented in the country.33 
In exploring efforts to coordinate, we focus here on two key initia-
tives set up in the wake of the crisis, i.e. since spring 2014. First, the 
Support Group for Ukraine (SG) was set up by a decision of the Council 
of the EU on 9 April 2014. It is administratively based in DG DEVCO, is 
composed of between 30 and 40 Brussels-based officials and is led by 
Peter Balas – a senior Commission official. These experts assist Ukrain-
ian governmental ministries and other institutions (e.g. the Verkhovna 
rada (parliament)) in drafting legislation, preparing reform proposals, 
developing communication strategies about reforms, etc. Members of 
the SG do not have a central coordination point on the Ukrainian side. 
The EU–Ukraine Agenda for Reform – adopted jointly by the EU and the 
government of Ukraine on 4 July 2014 – had foreseen the creation of an 
‘institution to be set up within the Government of Ukraine dealing with 
the process of political association and economic integration with the 
European Union’. As of the time of writing (December 2015) such an 
institution was still not in place, and cooperation with the Ukrainian 
side was conducted through multiple channels. SG experts were mostly 
attached to state secretaries in the various respective ministries, which 
brought a degree of fragmentation in their work. Realities on the 
ground also complicated their work, as state secretaries in some minis-
tries were appointed only three or four months after the October 2014 
elections in Ukraine. Hence, SG members often found themselves work-
ing without stable counterparts on the Ukrainian side.34 There were 
efforts to coordinate the work of the SG on the level of the EU Delega-
tion in Kiev. However, not all activities could be coordinated; moreo-
ver, and member states do not always provide information on their ac-
tivities on the ground to the SG or to the EU Delegation.35 In autumn 
2015, the SG was re-organized into sector teams in the following areas, 
corresponding to the reform packages outlined in the EU–Ukraine As-
sociation Agenda: agriculture; economic; education, science, health 
and social policy; energy and the environment; justice and home af-
fairs; political; trade and industry; transport and infrastructure.36 
The second structure established by the EU was the EU Advisory 
Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) – a 
                                                          
33  See  http://ukraine-gateway.org.ua/international-organizations/assistance-
database.html, accessed 24.11.15.  
34  Interview with two senior Slovak NGO experts involved in Ukraine reforms, Bratisla-
va, 20 June 2015 
35  Interview with senior diplomats, Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the EU, Brus-
sels, 28 May  2015; interview, Permanent Mission of Germany to the EU, Brussels, 
29 May  2015; interview with two senior Slovak NGO experts involved in reforms in 
Ukraine, Bratislava, 20 June  2015.  
36  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine/sgua/index_
en.htm, accessed 20.11.15.  
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civilian mission within the framework of the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP), set up by Council decision on 22 July 2014. 
The purpose of this unarmed non-executive mission has been to assist 
the Ukrainian authorities in reforming their security sector, including 
police and rule of law.37 The mission has been headed by Kalman 
Miszei, a Hungarian official with experience from working in various 
EU missions in the Neighbourhood; it is staffed by about 50 officials 
from the EU member states.  Miszei arrived in Kiev on 8 August 2014,38 
and was officially introduced to the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk, on 22 August by the head of the EU Delegation to Kiev, Jan 
Tombinski. Arguably, the purpose of this meeting was to explain the 
rationale and goals of EUAM to the country’s prime minister. As Miszei 
explained in an official press release: ‘This meeting was of utmost im-
portance, as I could directly present our mandate and our current level 
of development to the Prime Minister. We discussed the best ways to 
cooperate in the future.’39 At this point, EUAM already had a team of 17 
officials in Kiev preparing for mission deployment. However, it was not 
until 22 October 2014 that EUAM could report in an official press re-
lease on its website that it was ‘officially recognized as a coordinating 
interlocutor by the Ukrainian authorities’.40 This recognition was per-
ceived as given due to the fact that the EUAM Chief of Operations, Peter 
Appleby, and EUAM Senior Advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Interi-
or, Hanneke Brouwer, were invited to comment on a proposal for com-
prehensive reform of Ukraine’s security services at an ‘enlarged meet-
ing of the Ministry of the Interior’ featuring the presence of the Speaker 
of the Verkhovna Rada, the Minister of Interior, Minister of Defence, 
head of the Ukrainian security service, as well as some 100 participants 
from government and civil society organizations (ibid.). Formally, the 
EUAM started operations in December 2014. The level of coordination 
of EUAM and the SG with activities of EU member states was perceived 
as low or limited. As one senior German diplomat declared: ‘It seems 
we are repeating the mistakes we made in Kosovo or East Timor. All the 
donors rush in and there is lots of overlap, duplication and low coordi-
nation.’41 
Various organizations connected with the EU member states operate 
on the ground in Ukraine with relatively little coordination with the EU 
Delegation and/or EU institutions. Indeed, many of the current reform 
                                                          
37  ‘EU establishes mission to advise on civilian security sector reform in Ukraine’, 
Press Release, ST 11974/14, PRESSE 405, Brussels: Council of the EU, 22 July 2014 
38  See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140808_02_en.pdf, 
accessed 20.11.15  
39  See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/euam-
ukraine/docs/220814_hom_meeting_with_pm_.pdf, accessed 20.11.15  
40  See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/euam-
ukraine/news/20141022_2_en.htm, accessed 20.11.15. 
41  Interview, senior diplomat, Permanent mission of Germany to the EU, Brussels, 29 
May 2015. 
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efforts were preceded by initiatives launched earlier. One example is 
Germany’s GIZ, which has been operating in Ukraine since 1996, on 
the basis of an agreement between the German Federal Government 
and the Government of Ukraine. The GIZ is a German-registered, state 
owned corporation; in Ukraine it works mostly on projects of German 
governmental agencies, including the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development; the Federal Ministry for the Environ-
ment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety; the Federal Ministry for 
Economics and Technology; the Federal Ministry of Finance; the Fed-
eral Ministry of Economics and Technology; and the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior – as well as on projects of the EU and its member states. As 
of September 2015the GIZ had offices in 16 locations in Ukraine, with 
approximately 100 employees.42 
While Germany has various actors on the ground, Sweden seems to 
be channelling its assistance primarily through Ukraine state institu-
tions (through twinning and technical assistance), with the aim of 
building institutional capacity; or through Ukrainian civil society or-
ganisations, international nongovernmental organizations (such as 
National Democratic Institute, East Europe Foundation and Global Ac-
tion Plan), intergovernmental organizations (such as the Council of 
Europe and the OECD), as well as development banks (EBRD, the World 
Bank, NEFCO, EIB) through investment grants and technical assis-
tance.43 Norwegian assistance is given primarily as project grants to 
various Ukrainian state institutions.44 In some areas, such as energy 
safety, Norway works closely together with Sweden. The Norwegian 
government has pointed out that it tries to provide its assistance in 
close cooperation and coordination with the EU and the member states 
to avoid overlap, but this may prove challenging at times.45  
In addition to governments, expertise has been made available to 
the Ukrainian side by senior-level politicians from the EU, the USA and 
other NATO countries in the format of the International Advisory Coun-
cil on Reforms (IACR) official founded  by Ukrainian President Po-
roshenko on 13 May 2015. Press releases announced that senior fig-
ures like US Senator John McCain, former Swedish PM Carl Bildt, for-
mer Slovak PM Mikuláš Dzurinda, German MEP Elmar Brok and others 
were joining the group.46 However, Senator McCain announced one 
                                                          
42  See http://www.ims-ukraine.org/en/reform-municipal-services-eastern-ukraine 
(accessed 14.09.15).  
43  http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/Kyiv/Development-
Cooperation/Development-Cooperation-with-Ukraine/ 
44  http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/nb/sector/details?country=14&year=2015 
45  Information provided by the Norwegian embassy in Kiev, November 2015. 
46  See ‘Poroshenko Approves Composition of Advisory International Council of Re-
forms and Dissolves Advisory Council of Reforms’, USAID Rada Program, available 
at http://radaprogram.org/en/content/poroshenko-approves-composition-
advisory-international-council-reforms-and-dissolves#sthash.YByOgBNq.dpu; ac-
cessed 01.08.15. 
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day later that he could not join the group due to legal constraints not 
allowing Members of Congress to take on such an active role. Former 
president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, was originally named chair-
man of the IACR. However, he was appointed as governor of the Odessa 
region by President Poroshenko only two weeks later, on 30 May. It 
appears that Saakashvili assumed the post of governor of Odessa with-
out informing all members of the IACR.47 In the summer 2015, the role 
of the IACR and its high-level advisors remained relatively unclear, 
with some of them still waiting for clarification on what the Ukrainian 
side actually expected them to do.48 Moreover, there seemed to be nei-
ther official nor unofficial direct coordination contact between the IACR 
and the EU’s SG or member-state governments (ibid). 
In addition to this lack of coordination comes the fact that the mem-
ber states and other actors have been promoting differing priorities and 
approaches to the processes of EU-oriented reforms in Ukraine.  
4.3 Ambiguity of reform processes in Ukraine 
As the previous sections indicate, the EU, its member states and associ-
ated members (like Norway), together with their non-governmental 
organizations, have been involved in a wide range of reform processes 
in Ukraine. As our interviews with senior officials of the EEAS as well as 
member-state delegations to the EU confirm, member states have been 
involved in supporting various kinds of reforms – usually in areas 
where they have the necessary expertise and foreign policy priorities. 
Poland, for instance, has been actively involved in Ukraine, supporting 
anti-corruption measures and processes of decentralization. The Polish 
government’s anti-corruption agency has been working with the 
Ukrainian government in setting up the Ukrainian anti-corruption bu-
reau. Concerning decentralization, Polish experts have assisted the 
Ukrainian authorities in developing legislative proposals for reform of 
municipalities and municipal governance as well as the territorial 
structure of regions.49 Similar assistance activities have been conduct-
ed by experts from Germany, as well as from France and the USA.50 The 
Slovak government has been involved in two areas in particular: energy 
sector reform and security sector reform.51 Energy sector reform has 
also been a key priority of work carried out in Ukraine with the assis-
tance of the governments of Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.52 
France has been involved several reform initiatives; a key priority area 
has been the reform of Ukrainian justice sector.53 Civil society for-
                                                          
47  Interview, member of IACR, Bratislava, 20 June 2015. 
48  Expert interview, Bratislava, 20 June 2015. 
49  Interview, Polish mission to the EU, Brussels, 28 May 2015. 
50  Interview, German mission to the EU, 29 May, 2015. 
 
52 Interview, German mission to the EU, May 29, 2015. 
53 Interview, German mission to the EU, May 29, 2015. 
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mation and reforms have been the mainstay of the work done with as-
sistance from the Czech government.54 Norway has given priority to 
reform of the justice sector and energy reform, but has also been in-
volved in constitutional reform and nuclear safety issues. 
In addition to the wide range of reform processes that EU member 
states have been involved in – often in parallel – approaches have also 
varied among member states as regards the nature of Ukraine’s future 
association with the EU. As several interviewees pointed out, there has 
been one group of member states who favoured the development of the 
closest possible ties with Ukraine, not excluding the potential of offer-
ing full EU membership. This group has consisted mostly of the Baltic 
states, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Denmark and the UK. On the other 
hand, there have been several countries – most notably in the South of 
the EU – sceptical to offering Ukraine anything more than an Associa-
tion Agreement within the framework of the ENP. That also applies to 
the latest official standpoints of the German government, which has 
been increasingly cautious about going too far in deepening its rela-
tions with Ukraine in order to avoid damaging relations with ‘the 
neighbours of the neighbours – Russia.55 Germany is apparently be-
coming more and more aligned with France’s traditional position on 
ENP/EaP. While Germany has generally had a fairly open approach, the 
French have insisted on interpreting the ENP as clearly distinct from 
the enlargement process – and not even as a potential preparation 
phase for future membership. 
To address these coordination problems on the strategic level as 
well as on the level of practical conduct of reforms, the EU and its 
member states have been considering various solutions.  One of these is 
an idea voiced in some EU capitals: to appoint a ‘high level coordina-
tor’ on the EU side to lead the effort in Ukraine. Conceptually and in 
terms of mandate, such a coordinator would correspond more or less to 
the role of the EU’s High Representatives in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Ko-
sovo. Proponents of this idea have envisioned a senior political figure 
from the EU taking on the post (e.g. a former prime minister or foreign 
minister) so that the Ukraine reform agenda could be elevated to a 
higher level a receive proper attention in governmental circles and in 
EU-level institutions.56 However, as of summer 2015, such a post had 
not been established, and it seemed as though proposals for establish-
ing such a post were no longer on the agenda. This could be explained 
by lack of member-state consensus as to whether establishing such a 
post would be useful, especially in view of existing disagreements con-
cerning the long-term objective of the association process. It could also 
be explained strategically: the wish to avoid any further provocation of 
Russia. In such a perspective, a more effective option might be a less 
                                                          
54 Expert interview, Bratislava, 20 June 2015. 
55 Interview, German mission to the EU, 29 May 2015.  
56  Expert interview, Bratislava, 20 June  2015 
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visible ‘muddling through’ approach. In our interviews with represent-
atives of selected member-state missions to the EU in May 2015, some 
confirmed that debates on this point were ongoing among the member 
states. Other representatives, however, said that such debates were no 
longer on the table, and still others flatly denied the very existence of 
such a debate.57  
The reason for such an unstructured approach to Ukraine as op-
posed to, for example, Bosnia-Hercegovina since the late 1990s has 
been the fact that the latter did have a clear international governance 
structure in place, with a mandate to oversee societal transformation 
processes and approximation to the EU (Bildt 2015). Such a structure is 
lacking in Ukraine, and so the EU, its member states and other actors 
find themselves involved in supporting a multiplicity of transformation 
initiatives. The SG for Ukraine as well as the EU Delegation in Kiev have 
been seeking to coordinate efforts on the ground in Kiev but such coor-
dination is highly dependent on member-state willingness and capacity 
to coordinate.58 Moreover, as discussed in the previous sections, many 
member-state development projects in Ukraine have been initiated in-
dependently of each other, and follow time-lines and financing sched-
ules without little direct intergovernmental coordination. 
                                                          
57  Interviews with the permanent missions of Germany, Poland and Slovakia to the 
EU, Brussels, 27–29 May 2015.  
58  Expert interview, Bratislava, 20 June  2015; interviews EEAS HQ Brussels, 27 and 
28 May 2015. 
 5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have argued that the EU’s neighbourhood policy as a 
policy framework has been undergoing a profound transformation. 
This has been a process characterized by fragmentation of a once-
coherent policy framework towards an umbrella term for a set of differ-
entiated and fairly specific tailor- made policy approaches regulating 
relations with individual countries in the EU Neighbourhood. More 
profoundly, at the level of practice, the case of the Ukraine shows that 
the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, and the reform processes in the coun-
tries of this neighbourhood conducted as part of this policy, are not as 
rationally calculated as is often believed. Rather, much of what the EU 
and its member states are doing in Ukraine seems characterized by 
multiple and varying definitions of problems, a multitude of solutions 
generated and provided without clear connections with problems or 
before problems are defined, numerous participants and a plethora of 
reform processes with relatively little effective coordination. 
We found, first, that the EU’s reform efforts in Ukraine are character-
ized by parallelism – problems that need to be addressed are defined in 
multiple ways, with overlapping reform processes in initiatives run by 
the EU, by its member states, by associated non-member states as well 
as by other international actors. Second, we identified relatively high 
degrees of path-dependence in the reform programmes run by the EU 
and by Germany, medium-level path-dependence in Swedish pro-
grammes and low levels of path-dependence in reform projects run by 
Norway (see Figure 1). This indicates that major reform strategies 
launched in 2014 and 2015 for identifying problems in the post-
Maidan period were constructed in the context of a multitude of solu-
tions that were already being implemented on the ground, having been 
defined in the pre-Maidan period. This also makes it clear that the ENP 
is a highly socially embedded strategy, harnessing combinations of 
existing resources while also seeking to provide well-defined and ra-
tionally calculated reform proposals. Third, we have noted multiple 
and parallel coordination efforts by actors from the EU and from the 
member states, again challenging the view of the ENP as rationally 
managed process. Finally, the EU member states, associated non-
members and the EU institutions and their various constellations are 
evidently operating with differing visions as regards Ukraine’s future 
relations with the EU. This has made the ENP in Ukraine profoundly 
ambiguous.    
Some of this ambiguity in the EU’s role in the neighbourhood has al-
ready been discussed and criticized in the academic literature. Suffice it 
here to note the ‘capabilities–expectations gap’ (Hill 1993) or the 
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above-discussed view of the EU’s reform agenda as consisting of sym-
bolic actions and window-dressing (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011). 
However, there has been less focus on the possibility that such ambigu-
ity might actually be a source of strength and influence. As Olsen 
(2010) points out, the fact that the EU remains a rather ambiguous po-
litical entity which various actors associate with various meanings may 
in fact be a condition contributing to the EU’s survival. If the EU were 
clearly identified and following steps towards a specific type of political 
order (e.g. a federation), it would be easier for internal and external 
opponents of integration to organize resistance and even derail the 
process.  
Applied to the context of the ENP, the ambiguity of the EU’s en-
gagement with the neighbouring countries, featuring multiple and 
loosely coupled processes involving EU-level institutions as well as 
member-state initiatives, leads to uncertainty in terms of what is actu-
ally happening to the countries in the neighbourhood. As the case of 
Ukraine shows, there are competing and complementary visions as to 
the problems to be dealt with; it is unclear which solutions are useful 
and when; many participants are involved, and it is often uncertain 
who is responsible for which parts of the reform agenda, and when 
important decisions can and should be made.  
While this may seem a chaotic situation, it is arguably also more dif-
ficult for opponents of reforms – whether internal to Ukraine or from 
outside the country (‘neighbours of the neighbours’) – to stage effective 
opposition to reforms implemented according to such a ‘garbage can 
model’. And for these very reasons, it might be that this model will re-
sult in better governance structures in Ukraine, a deepening engage-
ment of Ukraine with the EU, and thereby a different and more flexible 
type of security community building process – all more sustainable in 
the long run. 
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